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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to own and operate racing establishments wherein pari-mutuel betting
is permitted could not be declared unconstitutional as violative of Sec-
tion 7, Section 31, or any other section of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. If this contention is accepted, then the responsibility for permitting
dog and horse racing with its counterpart, pari-mutuel betting, to infil-
trate the North Carolina scene rests solely upon the General Assembly.50
ROBERT D. LEWIS.
Credit Transactions-Conditional Sale Contracts-Default-Remedies
of Buyer and Seller-Liability of Buyer on Check or Note
Given as Down Payment or Installment Payment
In 1893 the North Carolina Supreme Court remarked that condi-
tional sale contracts "are becoming greater in frequency and general
interest. They are principally used in connection with the sale of sewing-
machines, pianos, furniture, soda-fountains, rolling stock on railroads,
and the like."' Today the frequency of such contracts is still increasing,
and the list of products sold under them must be enlarged to include a
variety of recently developed chattels, such as automobiles, television
sets, home appliances, adding machines, and factory equipment.
A typical form of conditional sale contract involves the credit sale
of personal property, where the buyer usually makes a down payment
and undertakes, often by a promissory note, to pay the balance of the
price in installments. Under the contract the buyer receives immediate
possession of the property, and the seller retains title as security together
with the accompanying right to repossession and resale in case of default,2
but the buyer has the power to gain complete title by making full pay-
ment. It is explained that the seller's retention of title distinguishes this
contract from a purchase money chattel mortgage where complete title
is vested in the buyer who immediately reconveys security title to the
seller.3
" For an excellent r~sum6 of racetrack operations in North Carolina, see Ra-
leigh News and Observer, February 14 through 18, 1951, a feature story in five
chapters by Jim Chaney.
1 Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 378, 383, 17 S. E. 174, 175 (1893).
The instrument that caused this comment was entitled a "lease," requiring periodic
"rentals" until title to a "soda water machine" was conveyed upon full payment,
but the court held it was a conditional sale contract.
2 Earlier notes have stated that in North Carolina the secured party under a
conditional sale contract has the right to repossession before default, unless the
parties manifest a contrary intention by agreement or conduct, and all the writers
suggest that this is undesirable. Notes, 21 N. C. L. REv. 387 (1943) ; 12 N. C. L.
REv. 254 (1934) ; 11 N. C. L. REv. 321 (1933).
'Frick & Co. v. Hilliard, 94 N. C. 117, 119 (1886); Gaul v. Goldburg Furniture
& Carpet Co., 85 Misc. 426, - , 147 N. Y. Supp. 516, 518 (Sup. Ct 1914);
Bogert, The Evolution of the Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8 CORNELL L. Q.
303, 304 (1923). --
However, the North Carolina court, in construing N. C. LAWS 1883, c. 342.
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After default, the conditional sale contract gives rise to legal questions
(1) as to the buyer's right to recover down payments or installment
payments, (2) as to the seller's liability for a wrongful repossession or
wrongful conduct while retaking the property sold, and (3) as to the
seller's remedies: suit on the contract; repossession and disposition of
the security; and suit for a deficiency judgment after repossession and
a resale of the property.
According to the weight of authority, the defaulting buyer cannot
recover any of the payments made prior to a proper repossession,4 unless
the seller has rescinded the agreement.5 Otherwise, "it would be offering
later N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-23 (1950), which provided for the registration of con-
ditional sale contracts "with the same legal effect as . . .chattel mortgages," has
stripped this analytical distinction of significance, indicating that conditional sale
contracts and chattel mortgages are of identical legal effect. Observer Mfg. Co.
v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E. 526, 527 (1917). For a recent restatement,
see Mitchell v. Battle, 231 N. C. 68, 69, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949): "Conditional
sales contracts in which title is retained as security for the debt are treated here
as chattel mortgages ... and statutes relating to chattel mortgage foreclosures and
incidents have more than analogical force." The 1883 statute was repealed at the
last session of the North Carolina General Assembly. N. C. SEss. LAWS 1953,
c. 1190, § 3. For comment on this statutory change see A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N. C. L. REV. 375, 429 (1953).
See Sneeden v. Nurnberger's Market, 192 N. C. 439, 440, 135 S. E. 328, 330
(1926), distinguishing a chattel mortgage where title but not necessarily possession
is transferred to the secured party, from a pledge where the secured party takes
possession immediately "with a right of retainer until the debt is paid," but no title.
2 WiLLIsToN, SALES § 337 (Rev. ed. 1948) explains that the conditional sale dis-
cussed herein does not involve land.
' 3 WI.isTON, SALES § 579c (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 66, 70
(1932) ; Note, 37 A. L. R. 91, 100 (1925), and cases cited therein. Contra: Mo.
Rxv. STAT. § 428.110 (1949), and OHio REV. CODE § 1319.14 (1953), requiring a
refund by the seller.
' Courts following the "election doctrine," as described below in the text, have
used the term "rescission" in describing the seller's election to repossess the security
rather than attempt a collection of the contract price. This is improper, because a
true rescission obliterates the contract, requiring the seller to return any payments
he has received. Daughley v. Peterson, 110 F. Supp. 885, 887 (D. Ala. 1953).
Decisions cited contrary to the rule allowing the seller to retain the defaulting
buyer's payments under a conditional sale contract often involve recovery of pay-
ments following a true rescission of the conditional sale contract, and are therefore
in accord with the majority view. See Weldon v. Witt, 145 Ala. 605, 40 So. 126
(1905), where there was a mutual rescission of the contract, and Moye v. Stobaugh,
199 Ark. 453, 135 S. W. 2d 334 (1940), where the security, a refrigerator, was
found defective and the contract rescinded.
In the following cases the contract was rescinded by the seller's conduct, and
the buyer was allowed to recover payments made less compensation for the use of
the property sold: Southern Finance Co. v. Chambers, 65 Ga. App. 259, 15 S. E.
2d 903 (1941) (Seller received possession of car to repair and .retained it, selling
it after default made subsequent to the time he gained possession.) ; Carmichael v.
Guenette, 61 Ga. App. 460, 6 S. E. 2d 365 (1939) (Seller rescinded by repossessing
car after agreeing to extend time for payments.); Dickerson v. Universal Credit
Co., 47 Ga. App. 512, 170 S. E. 822 (1933) (rescission by bringing trover suit).
Cf. Burge v. Crown Finance Co., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 582, 59 S. E. 2d 541 (1950).
Here the seller who had repossessed the security conducted a resale after promising
the buyer that he would extend the payment date, and the court reasoned that the
promise was without consideration, concluding that the buyer had no cause of
action against the seller. The court failed to distinguish the case from Carnichacl
v. Gueneite, and cited no authority.'
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a bounty for the violation of contracts," because the buyer cduld pur-
chase a chattel for speculative resale and default without reason, yet his
liability would be limited to compensation for the use of the property.6
The seller's right to sue for a breach of contract 7 or for the contract
price8 is recognized in North Carolina, but his most satisfactory remedy
is to retake the property sold, resell it and recover any deficiency found
by subtracting the down payment, installment payments and proceeds
realized by the resale from the price due the seller and the costs of the
sale.9 After repossession of the property sold, the buyer retains an equity
in it,10 and has been given the opportunity to redeem the property before
resale by paying the balance due under the contract.1 If the payments
and the proceeds of a resale exceed the total obligation, the buyer is
entitled to this "surplus.' u2  Although repossession and resale are ordi-
Another manner of rescission by conduct applicable in jurisdictions that require
a resale is explained in Blevins Aircraft Corp. v. Gardner, 66 Ga. App. 843, 845, 19
S. E. 2d 350, 352 (1942) : "the mere retaking of the property by the seller would
not constitute a rescission of the contract of sale, yet where the seller, after re-
taking the property, refrains for an unreasonable length of time from selling it ...
and devotes the property to a use inconsistent with an intention on his part to
resell it . . . , the inference is authorized that the seller has elected to treat the
property as his own, thereby rescinding the contract of sale."
The North Carolina Supreme Court has accurately stated that "repossession
of the title-retained property is not to be referred to the principle of rescission,
but to the power of sale given by statute [or contract]... ." Mitchell v. Battle, 231
N. C. 68, 69, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949). The statute referred to is N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.13 (1950), conferring a power of sale upon the seller where the conditional
sale contract does not contain an express power of sale.
'Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168, 174, 133 N. W. 97, 99 (1911).
'See National Cash Register Co. v. Hill, 136 N. C. 272, 276, 48 S. E. 637, 639
(1904).
" Ibid.
' Mitchell v. Battle, 231 N. C. 68, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949) ; Hall v. Tillman, 103
N. C. 276, 9 S. E. 194 (1889) ; second appeal, 110 N. C. 220, 14 S. E. 745 (1892);
third appeal, 115 N. C. 500, 20 S. E. 726 (1894).
Such procedure is specifically authorized in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950):"Whenever a power of sale contained in a conditional sale contract, or granted by
statute with respect thereto, is exercised, and the proceeds of such sale are not
sufficient to defray the expenses thereof, and also the balance of retaking, keeping
and storing the goods and the balance due upon the purchase price, the seller may
recover the deficiency from the buyer, or from anyone who has succeeded :to the
obligations of the buyer."
Accord: Federal Credit Co. v. Boleware, 163 Miss. 830, 142 So. 1 (1932)
Caraway v. jean, 97 N. H. 506, 92 A. 2d 660 (1952); Knudson Music Co. v.
Masterson, 240 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1952) ; see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Dickinson, 249 Ky. 422, 425, 60 S. W. 2d 967, 968 (1933).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1950) limits deficiency judgments "When any sale
of real estate or personal property has been made by a mortgagor, trustee, or other
person authorized to make the same, at which the mortgagee, payee or other holder
of the obligation thereby secured becomes the purchaser. . . ." Although this
language is quite broad, quaere whether the statute is applicable to conditional sales,
in light of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950) supra.
'0 See Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 384, 17 S. E. 174, 175
(1893). &
"1 Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S_ E. 174 (1893) ; see
Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N, C. 279, 284, 56 S. E. 929, 931 (1907).
"Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N. C. 279, $6 S. E. 929 (1907),; Puffer & Sons
1954]
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narily carried out without judicial supervision, where the seller brings
a well founded suit on the conditional sale contract after a default, the
trial court -may order that the property be resold and the proceeds
applied to payment of the debt, and then enter a deficiency judgment or
give a surplus to the buyer, depending upon whether the obligation is
satisfied by the proceeds.
13
Some jurisdictions are in accord with North Carolina,14 but by what
has been called the general holding apart from statute,'0 the seller must
elect whether he will sue on the contract and relinquish his rights in the
security, or repossess the property, thereby terminating both the buyer's
liability under the contract and the buyer's equity in the property.16
Since the use of one remedy is considered a bar to recovery under the
other, and there is never a deficiency judgment, this rule may at first
appear to protect the buyer. Actually, it works a great hardship on
the individual who has purchased property, and paid a large amount of
the price, by allowing the seller to retain all these payments and repossess
the security without accounting for its value, which may be far greater
than the sum due under the contract. It may also be unfair to the seller
who chooses to sue on the contract because the property is depreciated,
only to find that the buyer is insolvent. 17  Still other states follow this
Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174 (1893); see Universal C. I. T.
Credit Corp. v. Saunders, 235 N. C. 369, 371, 70 S. E. 2d 176, 178 (1952), where
the court said a repossessing seller must account to the defaulting buyer for the
value of the property repossessed.
Accord: Epps v. Howard, 87 Ga. App. 277, 73 S. E. 2d 342 (1952) ; Cutting v.
Whittmore, 72 N. H. 107, 54 Atl. 1098 (1903); see General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Dickinson, 249 Ky. 422, 425, 60 S. W. 2d 967, 968 (1933) ; Ross-Meehan
Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, 615, 18 So. 364, 365
(1895).
"Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N. C. 279, 56 S. E. 929 (1907) ; Puffer & Sons
Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174 (1893).
14 See footnotes 9 and 12 supra.
The New Hampshire court has stated the rule, "Resort to repossession and suit
for the price should not bar each other, and the remedies may well and properly
be concurrent to the point of satisfaction," in Mercier v. Nashua, 84 N. H. 59, 62,
146 Atl. 165, 167 (1929).
Virginia gives the seller five remedies against a defaulting buyer: "(1) To seek
the peaceable possession of the trucks (in the event redelivery was denied by the
defendant) ; (2) to institute an action at law for the recovery of the unpaid pur-
chase price; (3) to institute a suit in equity to foreclose the lien; (4) to proceed
under the ... Code for the sale or possession of the property and for a deficiency
judgment; or (5) by action of detinue under . . ." statute; and the first three are
said to be cumulative. Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 77, 190
S. E. 257, 259 (1937).
As discussed below in the text, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and Uniform
Commercial Code bear some similarity to the North Carolina view.
" 3 Wuusroiq, SALEs § 579b (Rev. ed. 1948).
"Thomas Auto Co. v. Moody, 206 Ark. XIX, 177 S. W. 2d 754 (1944) ; Igle-
heart Bros., Inc. v. John Deere Plow Co., 114 Ind. App. 182, 51 N. E. 2d 498 (1943)
(Indiana court presumed the Illinois common law was identical to its own, that
seller after default must make an election.).; C. I. T. Corporation v. Fisher, 187
Okla. 314, 102 P..2d 848 (1940).
" 'The uniform acts on -this subject-are designed to eliminate the possibility of
either of these results, as shown below in the text.
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election doctrine, but add a remedy called a "conditional sale contract
vendor's lien,"' 8 which enables the seller to bring a court action on the
security, sell it and if the price is still unsatisfied, obtain a deficiency
judgment' 9-the same process as that used in North Carolina when the
seller seeks judicial enforcement of the conditional sale contract after
default.
The seller is always penalized for an unauthorized retaking of the
property sold, 20 and most jurisdictions condemn the use of actual2 ' or
"implied" 22 force in making an authorized repossession. Further, the
seller has been held liable for conversion: where he gained possession
of the security through an authdrized retaking, extended the time in
which payments could be made, but conducted a resale prior to the
extended date of payment ;23 also, where the seller h6ld the security under
an agreement to repair it until a default was made under the conditional
sale contract, and then resold the property without notifying the buyer
of his intention to resell.24 Although most of these cases contemplate
an award of actual damages,25 punitive damages are not unknown.
2 6
8 Explained in National Cash Register Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 151, 282
N. W. 827, 829 (1938). See Note, 23 MixN. L. Rzv. 699 (1939)."0 Smith v. Russell, 223 Iowa 123, 272 N. W. 121 (1937) ; National Cash Regis-
ter Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 282 N. W. 827 (1938) ; see Lloyd v. Federal Motor
Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 77, 190 S. E. 257, 259 (1937).
" Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. of Calif., 111 Cal. App. 2d 431, 244
P. 2d 764 (1952) (Seller tried to enforce a note that was not a part of the condi-
tional sale contract, by repossessing the security.).
1 Lamb v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936). The courts of Louisiana
are most strict in this regard, having held a seller liable where he peaceably
entered the defaulting buyer's home and removed furniture that was security under
his conditional sale contract, with the consent of the buyer's mother and minor
son but without lawful process authorizing such action. Strahan v. Simmon, 15
So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1943).
" In American Discount Co. v. Wyckroff, 29 Ala. App. 82, -, 191 So.. 790,
794 (1939), implied force was defined as an act revealing an intention to take the
security in any event, with force if necessary. North Carolina is in accord, apply-
ing this definition where the seller's agents emphatically replied to the buyer's
objection to their retaking of the property that they would "take the car or have
the money." Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E.
2d 894, 896 (1942).
"' Brewer v. Universal Credit Co., 191 Miss. 183, 192 So. 902 (1940) ; Central
Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Ehr, 18 Wash. 2d 489, 139 P. 2d 701 (1943). The agree-
ment to extend the time for payments is effective, not because of any legal con-
sideration, but "may be rested upon the ground, of estoppel or of waiver." Reinkey
v. Findley Electric Co., 147 Minn. 161, 163, 180 N. W. 236, 237 (1920).
Cf. Carmichael v. Guenette, 61 Ga. App. 460, 6 S. E. 2d 365 (1939). Contra:
Burge v. Crown Finance Co., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 582, 59 S. E. 2d 541 (1950) ; see
footnote 5 supra.
"4 Patton v. Alexander, 202 Ark. 883, 154 S. W. 2d 1 (1941); ef. Southern
Finance Co. v. Chambers, 65 Ga. App. 259, 15 S. E. 2d 903 (1941) ; see footnote 5
sup ra.
2r' Quick v. Woodward Motor Co., 23 Tenn. App. 254, 130 S. W. 2d 147 (1938);
Ashworth v. Fleenor, 178 Va. 104, 16 S. E. 2d 309 (1941).
"Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894
(1942) (Seller was guilty of forcible trespass because he used implied force in
retaking a car.); Commercial Credit Co, v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So.. 439
(1938) (Seller's assignee repossessed car, knowing. the buyer had failed to make
19541
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
There are two uniform acts providing the seller with statutory reme-
dies after default-the Uniform Conditional Sales Act2 7 and the Uniform
Commercial Code.2  They provide for a redemption period following
default and repossession,29 during which the buyer may reclaim the
security by paying the amount due under the contract. If there is no
redemption, the buyer may demand a resale;8° and resale is also com-
pulsory under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act if the buyer has paid
one-half the purchase price,31 and under the Uniform Commercial Code
if the security is "consumer goods"3 2 and sixty per cent of the price is
paid. 33 If there be a resale both acts hold the buyer liable for a defi-
ciency84 but grant him any surplus 5 realized from the resale, as in North
Carolina. When resale is not compulsory, the seller may chose to resell
or keep the property,3 6 but the buyer is discharged from the contract
final payments only because assignee refused to band over the note that evidenced
his indebtedness.).
"' This act, prepared by Professor Bogert and recommended by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is now in force in Arizona,
Delaware, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Alaska and Hawaii. 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 6
(Supp. 1954).
28 A product of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, considered in many states and enacted
last year in Pennsylvania. Schnader, Pennsylvania Leads the Way: The First
State to Enact the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL
FINANCE LAw QUARTERLY REPORT 72 (1953).
20 Pursuant to the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 17, 18, if notice of the
seller's intention to repossess is given the defaulting buyer forty to twenty days
before repossession, the buyer may redeem his interest in the security by paying
the amount due at any time before repossession; if there is repossession without
this notice, the buyer has a ten day period for redemption. Under the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506, the buyer may redeem the security at any time before
resale or the seller's election to retain the security.
"0 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 20 (within ten days after the retaking);
UNIFORM COMMER cIAL CODE § 9-505 (2) (within thirty days after receiving a
required notice from the seller revealing his intention to retain the property).
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19 (Sale must be conducted within thirty
days following repossession.).
"' Goods are consumer goods if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes ... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
109(1).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(1) (sale conducted within ninety days
after repossession). Absent a request for it, resale is not compulsory if the buyer
has signed away his right to it, or when the contract does not cover a "purchase
money security interest." As defined in § 9-107, such an interest includes the type
of conditional sale contract discussed herein.
"' UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 22; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504(1). The latter applies only where a "security agreement secures an indebted-
ness . . . " which includes the type of conditional sale contract discussed herein.
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 21; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504(1) (under the circumstances explained in footnote 33 supra).
"0 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §20; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-
.505(2). Under the former act, the seller must give the buyer notice of his inten-
tion to resell within ten days after repossession but no notice of a retention of the
property is required of the seller; the Commercial Code is similar, but the seller
must give notice of his intention to retain the security, and there is no strict time
limit requiring a decision fo retain or resell.
[Vol. 33
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if there is no resale.37 To compel the seller to abide by the acts, the
buyer is given a cause of action against him for failure to meet the statu-
tory requirements.38 These uniform acts attempt to reconcile the in-
terests of buyer and seller by giving each party the right to have a
resale, providing for a redemption period and other more mechanical
requirements, such as time limitations and notices of resale.3 9 The
buyer who has paid a certain large portion of the price is given additional
protection by the mandatory resale. Although the acts are basically
quite similar, the Uniform Commercial Code encourages private re-
sales40 and is drawn in broad terms to cover other types of security
transactions in addition to conditional sales.
41
An additional problem is posed by a 1954 decision of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.42  This case involved a check, given as a cash
down payment by the buyer of a truck under a conditional sale contract,
that remained unpaid after proceeds from a resale failed to satisfy the
price, and the buyer was held liable on the check, although the seller's
conduct discharged the buyer of "all obligation" under Section 23 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act in force in West Virginia. 43  A dissent
argued that the down payment, and the written undertaking for the
balance of .the price that described the rights of the parties, should be
treated as one "obligation" under Section 23, and any discharge of the
"obligation" would include an unpaid check given as down payment.44
Under the same fact situation, absent the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, the buyer would be liable on this check in jurisdictions holding the
North Carolina view, for the seller is entitled to an amount equal to the
"
T
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 23; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-
505(2).
S UNIFORM CONDITIONA. SALES AcT § 25 (actual damages and in no event less
than one-fourth of all payments made); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1)
,Sactual damages and if security is "consumer goods," at least the amount of the
service charge!' and ten per cent of the cash price).
" Also, requirement of a seller's statement of the balance due under the con-
tract, UNIFORM CONDITONAL SALES AcT § 18; seller's notice of resale where it is
not compulsory, Id. at § 20, and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(2) ; adver-
tisement before a required public sale, UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19.
"o See draftsmen's comment following UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-504 (Text
and comments ed. 1952): "Although public sale is recognized, it is hoped that
private sale will be encouraged where.. as is frequently the case, private sale through
commercial channels will result in higher realization on collateral for the benefit
of all parties. The only restriction on the secured party's method of disposition
is that it must be commercially reasonable."
'I Compare the stricter time limits of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act with
the requirements of "good faith" and "commercially reasonable" action that are
set up in the Uniform Commercial Code. Draftsmen's comment, UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-507 (Text and comments ed. 1952).
'2 West Virginia Mack Sales Co. v. Henderson, 81 S.E. 2d 103 (W. Va. 1954).
"The seller had retained the truck over the resale period without giving notice
of his intention to resell, which constituted an election to retain it and discharged-
the buyer, who had paid less than one-half the contract price, under § 23 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
"West Virginia Mack Sales Co. v. Brown, 81, S. E. 2d 103, 111 (W. Va. 1954).
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contract price in any event. Where the election doctrine prevails the
buyer's liability turns on whether the check or note given as cash down
payment was a part of the conditional sale contract. 45 However, the
courts seem to differ on whether the term "conditional sale contract"
includes only the written undertaking making the conditional transfer
of the property, or encompasses paper given as down payment also.
40
If it is determined that the check or note given as cash down payment
was a part of the conditional sale contract, an election to repossess the
security is regarded as a bar to suit on it, as weli as the undertaking for
the balance ;47 and presumably, when the seller elects to sue on the con-
tract rather than repossess, the paper given as cash down payment and
the undertaking will stand together again, and the seller may recover on
both. A check or note given as cash down payment that is not a part
of the conditional sale contract is treated as consideration for the "use
and wear of the property," and the buyer is liable thereon, even after'
repossession.
48
An equitable treatment of the parties to a check or note given either
as down payment or installment payment would: (1) adopt the North
Carolina view on the remedies of buyer and seller after default; (2)
disregard whether the paper is part of the conditional sale contract; and
(3) hold the buyer liable unless he could recover the amount of the
check or note had it been paid. Applying this treatment, the seller would
recover if there were a suit for the price without repossession, or in case
of a resale, to the extent of any deficiency apart from the check or note;
but the buyer would not be liable where there was no deficiency or the
seller rescinded the contract. This would not penalize the conscientious
"' In Crute v. La Porte Discount Corp., 89 Ind. App. 573, -, 167 N. E. 542,
543 (1929), after observing that the buyer's note given as a down payment was
"a part of the original conditional agreement," the court held that the buyer was
released by the seller's election to recover the security and distinguished Norman
v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78 (1916), where a buyer was liable on his note
given as down payment, as follows: "In that case, the note sued on, and alleged to
have been given in lieu of a cash payment for property purchased, was a plain
promissory note, and was no part of the conditional sale contract."
". Compare Beene Motor Co., Inc. v. Dison, 180 Ark. 1064, 23 S. W. 2d 971
(1930), concerning a conditional sale contract that recited, "'The buyer has this
day paid to the seller two hundred and eighty-six ($286.00) dollars . . . '" which
the court interpreted as including the buyer's note for that amount given as down
payment with Franz v. Hair, 76 Utah 281, 283, 289 Pac. 130, 131 (1930), where
the conditional sale contract read, "'the purchaser has this day paid to the seller
two thousand five hundred sixty-seven and No/100 dollars ($2,567.00) ... '" and
the court held the buyer's note given in down payment for a part of this sum was
not included in the conditional sale contract.
"Beene Motor Co., Inc. v. Dison, 180 Ark. 1064, 1067, 23 S. W. 2d 971, 972
(1930) : "Since the $286 note . . .was included in the conditional sale agreement
for the sale of the truck, was a part of the purchase price recited therein, and title
to the property was retained until the whole purchase price was paid, it necessarily
follows ... that when appellant [seller] elected to retake the truck, it also elected
to cancel the balance of the indebtedness due against the car, which had the effect
of relieving appellee [buyer]. .. .""' Norman v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 538, 158 Pac. 78, 80 (1916).
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buyer who pays in cash or whose check or note is paid before reposses-
sion by allowing a tardy buyer to escape liability, and it would conform
with the intention of the parties that the amount of a check or note given
as cash down payment would be paid. In the final analysis, the seller
and buyer would be neither better nor worse off than they would have
been if cash had been paid in the place of the check or note.
Roy W. DAvis, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Nonexempt Work
Tolerance for Executives
A great many decisions determining whether, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, a particular employee is a "bona fide executive," have
turned on the sections of the regulations issued by the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor relating to
nonexempt work tolerance. One writer has estimated that at least half
of the overtime violations of the Act emanate from misinterpretations of
the executive exemption.1 The various administrative regulations dealing
with this exemption have therefore been chosen for comment in this note.
Section 13 (a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts from
the provisions of Section 6 (minimum wage), and Section 7 (maximum
hours) of the Act, any employee who is employed in a bona fide execu-
tive capacity, as such term is defined and delimited by the regulations
of the Administrator.2 The reason for this exemption is that a bona
fide executive is not ordinarily in the group that requires the protection
of the Act.3
It is to be noted at the outset that the Administrator's definition of
a "bona fide executive" is given Congressional sanction and is controlling
in determining who shall be exempt from the Act.4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, in applying the Administrator's definition, has said:
"Valid definitions within the delegated power speak with authority and
become the dictionary of the law." 5
Since 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act became effective,
the Administrator has acted three times to define the term "bona fide
I Bookstabler, Exemption of the "Boss Man" Under Section 13 (a), (1) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 69 N. J. L. J. 81 (1946). It is to be noted that since
all of the requirements of the definition must be met and since Section (f) of the
present definition requires that the employee be compensated on a salary basis at
a rate of not less than $55 per week, except in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands
where the minimum salary is $30, there are few cases where the general minimum
wage requirements of the act have been involved; most of the cases involve com-
pensation for overtime.
252 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §213 (1952). The Act's original provision
has remained unchanged since 1938.
' Bookstabler, supra note 1.
'Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 21 N. J. Misc. 76, 30 A. 2d 504 (1943).
' Pye v. Atlantic Co., 223 N. C. 92, 96, 25 S. E. 2d 401, 404 (1943).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
